Update dependency fastify to ^4.29.1 [SECURITY] by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #9 · yikesable/fastify-acl

renovate · 2026-02-03T15:54:09Z

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Adoption	Passing	Confidence
fastify (source)	`^4.17.0` → `^4.29.1`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-25223

Impact

A validation bypass vulnerability exists in Fastify where request body validation schemas specified by Content-Type can be completely circumvented. By appending a tab character (\t) followed by arbitrary content to the Content-Type header, attackers can bypass body validation while the server still processes the body as the original content type.

For example, a request with Content-Type: application/json\ta will bypass JSON schema validation but still be parsed as JSON.

This vulnerability affects all Fastify users who rely on Content-Type-based body validation schemas to enforce data integrity or security constraints. The concrete impact depends on the handler implementation and the level of trust placed in the validated request body, but at the library level, this allows complete bypass of body validation for any handler using Content-Type-discriminated schemas.

This issue is a regression or missed edge case from the fix for a previously reported vulnerability.

Patches

This vulnerability has been patched in Fastify v5.7.2. All users should upgrade to this version or later immediately.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, user can implement a custom onRequest hook to reject requests containing tab characters in the Content-Type header:

fastify.addHook('onRequest', async (request, reply) => {
  const contentType = request.headers['content-type']
  if (contentType && contentType.includes('\t')) {
    reply.code(400).send({ error: 'Invalid Content-Type header' })
  }
})

Resources

CVE-2026-3635

Summary

When trustProxy is configured with a restrictive trust function (e.g., a specific IP like trustProxy: '10.0.0.1', a subnet, a hop count, or a custom function), the request.protocol and request.host getters read X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Host headers from any connection — including connections from untrusted IPs. This allows an attacker connecting directly to Fastify (bypassing the proxy) to spoof both the protocol and host seen by the application.

Affected Versions

fastify <= 5.8.2

Impact

Applications using request.protocol or request.host for security decisions (HTTPS enforcement, secure cookie flags, CSRF origin checks, URL construction, host-based routing) are affected when trustProxy is configured with a restrictive trust function.

When trustProxy: true (trust everything), both host and protocol trust all forwarded headers — this is expected behavior. The vulnerability only manifests with restrictive trust configurations.

Release Notes

fastify/fastify (fastify)

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GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

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⚠️ Security Release ⚠️

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renovate bot commented Feb 3, 2026 •

edited

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