chore(deps): bump actions/checkout from 6 to 7#1238
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Bumps [actions/checkout](https://github.com/actions/checkout) from 6 to 7. - [Release notes](https://github.com/actions/checkout/releases) - [Changelog](https://github.com/actions/checkout/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md) - [Commits](actions/checkout@v6...v7) --- updated-dependencies: - dependency-name: actions/checkout dependency-version: '7' dependency-type: direct:production update-type: version-update:semver-major ... Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
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| runs-on: windows-latest | ||
| steps: | ||
| - uses: actions/checkout@v6 | ||
| - uses: actions/checkout@v7 |
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GitHub Actions step uses a mutable tag or branch reference. Tags and branch names can be silently repointed by the action owner, enabling supply-chain attacks — as seen in the trivy-action and kics-github-action compromises. Pin the reference to a full 40-character commit SHA instead, e.g. uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608.
🥳 Fixed in commit cd345ef 🥳
| runs-on: ubuntu-24.04 | ||
| steps: | ||
| - uses: actions/checkout@v6 | ||
| - uses: actions/checkout@v7 |
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Semgrep identified an issue in your code:
actions/checkout@v7 is a mutable tag, so a repointed tag could run attacker-controlled code in your release jobs with repository write access.
More details about this
actions/checkout@v7 pulls whatever code the v7 tag points to at runtime instead of a specific commit. In this releases job, that action runs before GoReleaser and has access to the checked-out repository plus the job’s contents: write permission, so if the v7 tag were ever repointed to attacker-controlled code, that code would execute during your release pipeline.
A plausible attack looks like this:
- An attacker compromises the
actions/checkoutaction or gains the ability to move itsv7tag to a different commit. - Your workflow starts on a tag push (
if: ${{ github.ref_type == 'tag' }}) and runs- uses: actions/checkout@v7in thereleasesjob. - GitHub resolves
@v7to the attacker’s commit, and the malicious action code runs onubuntu-24.04inside your release job. - That code can read the repository contents fetched by
actions/checkout, use the job’scontents: writepermission to alter release artifacts or create/update a GitHub release, and accessGITHUB_TOKENlater exposed to the GoReleaser step. - The result is a supply-chain compromise where users download a release produced or modified by attacker-controlled code, even though your workflow file still says
actions/checkout@v7.
The same risk also appears in the releases-windows job, which uses the same mutable actions/checkout@v7 reference before building Windows releases.
To resolve this comment:
✨ Commit fix suggestion
| - uses: actions/checkout@v7 | |
| - uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608 | |
| with: | |
| fetch-depth: 0 # required by GoReleaser (https://goreleaser.com/ci/actions/#fetch-all-history) |
View step-by-step instructions
- Replace the mutable action reference
actions/checkout@v7with a full 40-character commit SHA for the exact release you want to trust, for exampleactions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608. - Apply the same change to the other
actions/checkout@v7step shown in this workflow so both checkout steps use the same pinned commit. - Keep the existing
with:block unchanged, so the step still usesfetch-depth: 0after pinning. Pinning to a commit SHA prevents the action owner from silently changing what code runs under the same tag name. - Alternatively, if you need a newer
actions/checkoutrelease than the example SHA, look up the commit behind that release on the action's GitHub releases page and pinuses:to that 40-character SHA instead of the version tag.
💬 Ignore this finding
Reply with Semgrep commands to ignore this finding.
/fp <comment>for false positive/ar <comment>for acceptable risk/other <comment>for all other reasons
Alternatively, triage in Semgrep AppSec Platform to ignore the finding created by github-actions-mutable-action-tag.
You can view more details about this finding in the Semgrep AppSec Platform.
Legal RiskThe following dependencies were released under a license that RecommendationWhile merging is not directly blocked, it's best to pause and consider what it means to use this license before continuing. If you are unsure, reach out to your security team or Semgrep admin to address this issue. MPL-2.0 |
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Bumps actions/checkout from 6 to 7.
Release notes
Sourced from actions/checkout's releases.
Changelog
Sourced from actions/checkout's changelog.
... (truncated)
Commits
9c091bbupdate error wording (#2467)1044a6dgetting ready for checkout v7 release (#2464)f028218Bump the minor-npm-dependencies group across 1 directory with 3 updates (#2462)d914b26upgrade module to esm and update dependencies (#2463)537c7efBump@actions/coreand@actions/tool-cacheand Remove uuid (#2459)130a169Bump js-yaml from 4.1.0 to 4.2.0 (#2461)7d09575Bump flatted from 3.3.1 to 3.4.2 (#2460)0f9f3aaBump actions/publish-immutable-action (#2458)f9e715ablock checking out fork pr for pull_request_target and workflow_run (#2454)Dependabot will resolve any conflicts with this PR as long as you don't alter it yourself. You can also trigger a rebase manually by commenting
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