@@ -5095,8 +5095,7 @@ <h3>Signature-Based Correlation</h3>
50955095 </ li >
50965096 < li >
50975097cryptographic material associated with the digital signature, such as
5098- a public key identifier
5099- digital signature.
5098+ a public key identifier.
51005099 </ li >
51015100 </ ul >
51025101
@@ -5518,8 +5517,8 @@ <h3>Aggregation of Credentials</h3>
55185517 </ p >
55195518
55205519 < p >
5521- The solution to the privacy implications of correlation or aggregation tends not
5522- to be technological in nature, but policy-driven instead. Therefore, if a
5520+ The solution to the privacy implications of correlation or aggregation tends
5521+ not to be technological in nature, but policy-driven instead. Therefore, if a
55235522[=holder=] wishes to avoid the aggregation of their information, they must
55245523express this in the [=verifiable presentations=] they transmit, and
55255524by the [=holders=] and [=verifiers=] to whom they transmit their
@@ -5599,8 +5598,8 @@ <h3>Patterns of Use</h3>
55995598and instead use, for example, a privacy-preserving revocation list.
56005599 </ li >
56015600 < li >
5602- [=Issuers=] avoiding the association of personally identifiable information with
5603- any specific long-lived [=subject=] identifier.
5601+ [=Issuers=] avoiding the association of personally identifiable information
5602+ with any specific long-lived [=subject=] identifier.
56045603 </ li >
56055604 </ ul >
56065605
@@ -5718,9 +5717,9 @@ <h3>Data Theft</h3>
57185717extracted from hardware or other devices. It is further suggested that
57195718[=holders=] store and manipulate their data only on devices they
57205719control, away from centralized systems, to reduce the likelihood of
5721- an attack on their data or inclusion in a large-scale theft if an attack is successful.
5722- Furthermore, [=holders=] are encouraged to rigorously control access to
5723- their credentials and presentations, allowing access only to those
5720+ an attack on their data or inclusion in a large-scale theft if an attack is
5721+ successful. Furthermore, [=holders=] are encouraged to rigorously control
5722+ access to their credentials and presentations, allowing access only to those
57245723with explicit authorization.
57255724 </ p >
57265725 < p >
@@ -5853,10 +5852,10 @@ <h3>Issuer Cooperation Impacts on Privacy</h3>
58535852information that might have been leaked by the [=issuer=], such as the
58545853[=subject's=] home address. To mitigate such leakage, [=issuers=] might
58555854use common identifiers to mask specific location information or other sensitive
5856- metadata; for example, a shared [=issuer=] identifier at a state or national level
5857- instead of at the level of a county, city, town, or other smaller municipality.
5858- Further, [=verifiers=] can use [=holder=] attestation mechanisms to
5859- preserve privacy, by providing proof that an [=issuer=] exists in a set of
5855+ metadata; for example, a shared [=issuer=] identifier at a state or national
5856+ level instead of at the level of a county, city, town, or other smaller
5857+ municipality. Further, [=verifiers=] can use [=holder=] attestation mechanisms
5858+ to preserve privacy, by providing proof that an [=issuer=] exists in a set of
58605859trusted entities without needing to disclose the exact [=issuer=].
58615860 </ p >
58625861 </ section >
@@ -5912,8 +5911,8 @@ <h3>Key Management</h3>
59125911referred to [[NIST-SP-800-57-Part-1]] for more extensive recommendations and
59135912discussion. As strongly recommended in both [[FIPS-186-5]] and
59145913[[NIST-SP-800-57-Part-1]], a private signing key is not to be used for multiple
5915- purposes, for example, a private signing key is not to be used for encryption as well
5916- as signing.
5914+ purposes, for example, a private signing key is not to be used for encryption
5915+ as well as signing.
59175916 </ p >
59185917 < p >
59195918[[NIST-SP-800-57-Part-1]] strongly advises that private signing keys and
@@ -5958,9 +5957,9 @@ <h3>Content Integrity Protection</h3>
59585957 < p >
59595958Implementers are urged to understand how links to external machine-readable
59605959content that are not content-integrity protected could result in successful
5961- attacks against their applications, and utilize the content integrity protection
5962- mechanism provided by this specification if a security issue could occur
5963- if the external resource is changed.
5960+ attacks against their applications, and utilize the content integrity
5961+ protection mechanism provided by this specification if a security issue could
5962+ occur if the external resource is changed.
59645963 </ p >
59655964
59665965 </ section >
@@ -6119,9 +6118,9 @@ <h3>Device Theft and Impersonation</h3>
61196118 </ ul >
61206119
61216120 < p >
6122- Furthermore, instances of impersonation can manifest in various forms, including
6123- situations where an [=entity=] attempts to disavow their actions. Elevating
6124- the level of trust and security within the realm of [=verifiable
6121+ Furthermore, instances of impersonation can manifest in various forms,
6122+ including situations where an [=entity=] attempts to disavow their actions.
6123+ Elevating the level of trust and security within the realm of [=verifiable
61256124credentials=] entails more than just averting impersonation; it involves the
61266125implementation of non-repudiation mechanisms. These mechanisms solidify an
61276126[=entity's=] responsibility for their actions or transactions, thereby
@@ -6151,9 +6150,9 @@ <h4>Unauthorized Use</h4>
61516150violation</ i > . Consider an example where a [=holder=] shares a [=verifiable
61526151presentation=] with a [=verifier=] to establish their age and residency
61536152status. If the [=verifier=] then proceeds to exploit the [=holder's=] data
6154- without proper consent, such as by selling the data to a data broker, that would
6155- constitute an unauthorized use of the data, violating an expectation of privacy
6156- that the [=holder=] might have in the transaction.
6153+ without proper consent, such as by selling the data to a data broker, that
6154+ would constitute an unauthorized use of the data, violating an expectation of
6155+ privacy that the [=holder=] might have in the transaction.
61576156 </ p >
61586157 < p >
61596158Similarly, an [=issuer=] could make use of a
@@ -6217,9 +6216,9 @@ <h3>Code Injection</h3>
62176216processing language and base direction information.
62186217 </ li >
62196218 < li >
6220- It increases the security attack surface when utilizing this data model, because
6221- naively processing HTML could result in the execution of a `script` tag that
6222- an attacker injected at some point during the data production process.
6219+ It increases the security attack surface when utilizing this data model,
6220+ because naively processing HTML could result in the execution of a `script`
6221+ tag that an attacker injected at some point during the data production process.
62236222 </ li >
62246223 </ ul >
62256224
@@ -6561,10 +6560,10 @@ <h4>Holder</h4>
65616560[=verifier=]. For example, a [=holder=] can publish information containing
65626561the [=verification material=] used to secure [=verifiable presentations=]. This
65636562metadata is used when checking proofs on [=verifiable presentations=].
6564- Some cryptographic identifiers contain all necessary metadata in the identifier itself.
6565- In those cases, no additional metadata is required. Other identifiers use verifiable data
6566- registries where such metadata is automatically published for use by
6567- [=verifiers=], without any additional action by the [=holder=].
6563+ Some cryptographic identifiers contain all necessary metadata in the identifier
6564+ itself. In those cases, no additional metadata is required. Other identifiers
6565+ use verifiable data registries where such metadata is automatically published
6566+ for use by [=verifiers=], without any additional action by the [=holder=].
65686567 </ p >
65696568 < p >
65706569See the < a data-cite ="VC-IMP-GUIDE/#subject-holder-relationships "> </ a > and
@@ -6738,11 +6737,11 @@ <h3>Fitness for Purpose</h3>
67386737 < h3 > "Artificial Intelligence" and "Machine Learning"</ h3 >
67396738
67406739 < p >
6741- Systems using what is today commonly referred to as "artificial intelligence" and/or "machine learning" might be capable of performing
6742- complex tasks at a level that meets or exceeds human performance.
6743- This might include tasks such as the acquisition and use of
6744- [=verifiable credentials=].
6745- Using such tasks to distinguish between human and automated "bot" activity, as is
6740+ Systems using what is today commonly referred to as "artificial intelligence"
6741+ and/or "machine learning" might be capable of performing complex tasks at a
6742+ level that meets or exceeds human performance. This might include tasks such as
6743+ the acquisition and use of [=verifiable credentials=]. Using such tasks to
6744+ distinguish between human and automated "bot" activity, as is
67466745commonly done today with a < a href ="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CAPTCHA "> CAPTCHA</ a > ,
67476746for instance, might thereby cease to provide adequate or acceptable protection.
67486747 </ p >
@@ -6751,12 +6750,13 @@ <h3>"Artificial Intelligence" and "Machine Learning"</h3>
67516750Implementers of security architectures that use [=verifiable credentials=]
67526751and/or perform validation on their content are urged to consider the existence
67536752of machine-based actors, such as those which are today commonly referred to as
6754- "artificial intelligence", that might legitimately hold [=verifiable credentials=]
6755- for use in interactions with other systems. Implementers might also consider how
6756- threat actors could couple such "artificial intelligence" systems with [=verifiable
6757- credentials=] to pose as humans when interacting with their systems. Such systems
6758- might include, but not be limited to, global infrastructure such as social media,
6759- election, energy distribution, supply chain, and autonomous vehicle systems.
6753+ "artificial intelligence", that might legitimately hold [=verifiable
6754+ credentials=] for use in interactions with other systems. Implementers might
6755+ also consider how threat actors could couple such "artificial intelligence"
6756+ systems with [=verifiable credentials=] to pose as humans when interacting with
6757+ their systems. Such systems might include, but not be limited to, global
6758+ infrastructure such as social media, election, energy distribution, supply
6759+ chain, and autonomous vehicle systems.
67606760 </ p >
67616761
67626762 </ section >
@@ -7128,13 +7128,13 @@ <h3>Differences between Contexts, Types, and CredentialSchemas</h3>
71287128 </ p >
71297129
71307130 < p >
7131- While it is possible to use some [[JSON-LD11]] features to allude to the contents
7132- of the [=verifiable credential=], it's not generally suggested to use
7133- `@context` to constrain the data types of the data model. For
7134- example, `"@type": "@json"` is useful for leaving the semantics
7135- open-ended and not strictly defined. This can be dangerous if the implementer is
7136- looking to constrain the data type of the claims in the
7137- [=credential=], and is expected not to be used.
7131+ While it is possible to use some [[JSON-LD11]] features to allude to the
7132+ contents of the [=verifiable credential=], it's not generally suggested to use
7133+ `@context` to constrain the data types of the data model. For example,
7134+ `"@type": "@json"` is useful for leaving the semantics open-ended and not
7135+ strictly defined. This can be dangerous if the implementer is looking to
7136+ constrain the data type of the claims in the [=credential=], and is expected
7137+ not to be used.
71387138 </ p >
71397139
71407140 < p >
@@ -7150,8 +7150,8 @@ <h3>Differences between Contexts, Types, and CredentialSchemas</h3>
71507150 < h2 > IANA Considerations</ h2 >
71517151
71527152 < p >
7153- This section will be submitted to the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG)
7154- for review, approval, and registration with IANA.
7153+ This section will be submitted to the Internet Engineering Steering Group
7154+ (IESG) for review, approval, and registration with IANA.
71557155 </ p >
71567156
71577157 < section id ="vc-ld-media-type ">
@@ -7178,8 +7178,8 @@ <h2>application/vc</h2>
71787178 < td >
71797179Resources that use the `application/vc` media type are required to conform to
71807180all of the requirements for the `application/ld+json` media type and are
7181- therefore subject to the same encoding considerations specified in Section 11 of
7182- [[[RFC7159]]].
7181+ therefore subject to the same encoding considerations specified in Section 11
7182+ of [[[RFC7159]]].
71837183 </ td >
71847184 </ tr >
71857185 < tr >
@@ -7209,9 +7209,9 @@ <h2>application/vc</h2>
72097209 < p >
72107210The credential is expected to be a valid
72117211< a data-cite ="JSON-LD11#dfn-json-ld-document "> JSON-LD document</ a > .
7212- [=Verifiable credentials=] served with the `application/vc` media type are expected
7213- to have all [[[JSON-LD11]]] context information, including references to
7214- external contexts, within the body of the document. Contexts linked via a
7212+ [=Verifiable credentials=] served with the `application/vc` media type are
7213+ expected to have all [[[JSON-LD11]]] context information, including references
7214+ to external contexts, within the body of the document. Contexts linked via a
72157215`http://www.w3.org/ns/json-ld#context` HTTP Link Header
72167216(see < a data-cite ="JSON-LD11#interpreting-json-as-json-ld "> Section 6.1</ a >
72177217of [[[JSON-LD11]]]) are ignored.
@@ -7242,8 +7242,8 @@ <h2>application/vp</h2>
72427242 < td >
72437243Resources that use the `application/vp` media type are required to conform to
72447244all of the requirements for the `application/ld+json` media type and are
7245- therefore subject to the same encoding considerations specified in Section 11 of
7246- [[[RFC7159]]].
7245+ therefore subject to the same encoding considerations specified in Section 11
7246+ of [[[RFC7159]]].
72477247 </ td >
72487248 </ tr >
72497249 < tr >
@@ -7325,19 +7325,21 @@ <h2>Additional Diagrams for Verifiable Presentations</h2>
73257325parenthetical remark '(a named graph)'
73267326 ">
73277327 < figcaption style ="text-align: center; ">
7328- A variant of [[[#info-graph-vp]]]: information [=graphs=] associated with a [=verifiable presentation=]
7329- referring to two
7330- verifiable credentials, using an [=embedded proof=] based on [[[VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]]] [[?VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]].
7328+ A variant of [[[#info-graph-vp]]]: information [=graphs=] associated
7329+ with a [=verifiable presentation=] referring to two verifiable
7330+ credentials, using an [=embedded proof=] based on
7331+ [[[VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]]] [[?VC-DATA-INTEGRITY]].
73317332 </ figcaption >
73327333 </ figure >
73337334
73347335 < p >
7335- [[[#info-graph-vp-jwt-mult-creds]]] below shows the same [=verifiable presentation=]
7336- as [[[#info-graph-vp-mult-creds]]], but using an [=enveloping proof=] based on [[?VC-JOSE-COSE]].
7336+ [[[#info-graph-vp-jwt-mult-creds]]] below shows the same
7337+ [=verifiable presentation=] as [[[#info-graph-vp-mult-creds]]], but
7338+ using an [=enveloping proof=] based on [[?VC-JOSE-COSE]].
73377339 Each [=verifiable credential graph=] contains a single
7338- < a href ="#defn-EnvelopedVerifiableCredential "> `EnvelopedVerifiableCredential`</ a > instance,
7339- referring, via a `data:` URL [[RFC2397]], to a verifiable credential secured via
7340- an [=enveloping proof=].
7340+ < a href ="#defn-EnvelopedVerifiableCredential "> `EnvelopedVerifiableCredential`</ a >
7341+ instance, referring, via a `data:` URL [[RFC2397]], to a verifiable
7342+ credential secured via an [=enveloping proof=].
73417343 </ p >
73427344
73437345 < figure id ="info-graph-vp-jwt-mult-creds ">
@@ -7369,8 +7371,10 @@ <h2>Additional Diagrams for Verifiable Presentations</h2>
73697371'cYjaSdfIoJH45NIqw3MYnasGIba...'.
73707372 ">
73717373 < figcaption style ="text-align: center; ">
7372- A variant of [[[#info-graph-vp-jwt]]]: information [=graphs=] associated with a [=verifiable presentation=]
7373- referring to two verifiable credentials using [=enveloping proofs=] based on JOSE [[?VC-JOSE-COSE]].
7374+ A variant of [[[#info-graph-vp-jwt]]]: information [=graphs=]
7375+ associated with a [=verifiable presentation=] referring to two
7376+ verifiable credentials using [=enveloping proofs=] based on JOSE
7377+ [[?VC-JOSE-COSE]].
73747378 </ figcaption >
73757379 </ figure >
73767380
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